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Equitable Compensation and the Brickenden
“Rule” After Winsta Holding Pte Ltd and another v
Sim Poh Ping and others
The Brickenden rule, which was thought to provide an exception to the requirement of but-for causation of loss in
equitable compensation for breach of  duciary duty, has recently been rejected by the Singapore High Court in Winsta
Holding Pte Ltd and another v Sim Poh Ping and others  (Winsta Holding). This case comment suggests that although the
substantive position arrived at in Winsta Holding is a sound one, it should not entail a rejection of the Brickenden rule.
Properly understood, the Brickenden “rule” is consistent with the requirement that the principal prove but-for causation.
Introduction
In Brickenden v London Loan Savings Co  (Brickenden), the Privy Council in 1934 appeared to have established a rule
(the Brickenden rule) that either dispensed with the need to prove causation of loss in a claim for equitable compensation
for breach of  duciary duty entirely, or at least assisted the principal in establishing causation by reversing the burden of
proof. The Brickenden rule was a late transplant into Singapore law, having been judicially adopted only in 2013,  but
quickly entrenched itself in a string of High Court decisions over the years that followed.
This changed with Winsta Holding, a decision of the Honourable Justice Chua Lee Ming (the Judge) rendered in November
2018. The Judge rejected the Brickenden rule, holding that a principal bringing a claim for equitable compensation for
breach of  duciary duty must prove but-for causation of her loss without any reversal of the burden of proof. Applying that
analysis to the facts before him, the Judge partly disallowed the plainti s’ claim, on the basis that but-for causation had not
been proven in respect of part of the plainti s’ losses. The decision is on appeal.
In the author’s view, the position established in Winsta Holding is sound, but the articulation of that outcome as requiring,
or resulting from, the rejection of the Brickenden rule is not quite accurate. On a proper analysis, Brickenden is consistent
with and indeed involves the application of ordinary principles of but-for causation, which the principal must prove.
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The Decision in Winsta Holding
Winsta Holding concerned claims by Winsta Holding Pte Ltd and its subsidiaries (the Winsta Subsidiaries; collectively, the
Winsta Group), which were in the hostel and serviced apartments business, against certain of its directors. The relevant
claims for present purposes concerned the following alleged breaches of  duciary duties:
1. Diversion of opportunities (speci cally, opportunities to operate two serviced apartment projects, and to house
foreign students during a certain summer camp in 2014) away from the Winsta Group toward companies associated
with the defendant directors;
2. The procurement of the Winsta Group’s entry into interested-party transactions (IPTs) involving the rental of certain
units owned by the Winsta Group (which were then rented onwards to the ultimate tenants), the provision of catering
services to the Winsta Group, and the provision of air-conditioning servicing and general maintenance services to
the Winsta Group, all by companies associated with the defendant directors; and
3. The misuse of some of the Winsta Group’s support/administrative resources for the operation of a company in which
one of the defendant directors was interested.
The Winsta Group sought equitable compensation rather than an account of pro ts, triggering an inquiry into causation of
their losses. The losses claimed included pro ts which the Winsta Subsidiaries had to forego because they were placed
under creditors’ voluntary liquidation (the post-liquidation losses), allegedly due to  nancial di culties caused by the
defendant directors’ breaches.
On the facts, the Judge found for the Winsta Group on the issue of breach. Turning then to the issue of causation, the
Judge considered what the applicable principles were. The Judge summarised Brickenden as “stand[ing] for the
proposition that but-for causation is not essential for liability for breach of  duciary duty” and that “in the context of
equitable compensation, it is not necessary to show a causal link between the breach and the loss claimed”.  Against
this, he highlighted the contrary holding by the House of Lords in Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns (a  rm)  (Target
Holdings) that but-for causation was necessary.
The Judge noted that Brickenden had been academically criticised, including by Tan Ruo Yu in “Causation in Equitable
Compensation: The Brickenden Rule in Singapore”.  He then considered the UK Supreme Court’s decision in AIB Group
(UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors,  which con rmed the position in Target Holdings that but-for causation was
required, though without the requirement of foreseeability.
Finally, the Judge considered the Singapore cases on Brickenden. He observed that an attempt had been made in QAM
and Then Khek Koon to reconcile Brickenden and Target Holdings “by limiting Brickenden … to cases involving  duciaries
in one of the well-established categories of  duciaries and culpable breaches of core duties of honesty and  delity”,
and that the correctness of this position had been left open by the Court of Appeal on appeal from the decision in Then
Khek Koon in Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani and another and other appeals (Maryani Sadeli).  The Judge
referred as well to Beyonics Technology Ltd and another v Goh Chan Peng and others,  which (as summarised by the
Judge) had explained QAM and Then Khek Koon as follows:
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This is what has been referred to as the “weak” conception of the Brickenden rule, in contrast to the “strong” conception of
the Brickenden rule, which dispenses with the need for causation altogether when triggered.
Having surveyed the above authorities, the Judge held that “Brickenden should not be followed in Singapore” and that he
“respectfully agree[d] with the decision in AIB”.  The Judge held that “whether a  duciary belongs to a well-established
category of  duciaries or not, or whether the breach is of a core duty or is innocent”, the same position applied, which was
that “the bene ciary should be compensated for loss su ered as a result of that breach and no more”.  The Judge also
saw “no reason in principle why the evidential burden on causation should shift to the  duciary on the mere ground that
the principal proves that the breach “is in some way connected” to the loss”  (making it clear that the Judge’s rejection of
Brickenden extended to the “weak” Brickenden rule as well).
Applying these principles to the facts before him, the Judge concluded that the Winsta Group had proven but-for causation
only in respect of some of the losses. The losses that were not claimable included the summer camp opportunity (as it
could not have been taken up by the Winsta Group in any event), the IPTs involving rental of the units owned by the Winsta
Group (as on the facts the Winsta Group would have obtained the same pro t, or even less, had it rented directly to the
ultimate tenants), and the post-liquidation pro ts (as the liquidation of the Winsta Subsidiaries was due to  nancial
di culties unrelated to the breaches of  duciary duties).
Commentary – The Right Substantive Position in Not Quite
the Right Words
The Judge’s reasoning in Winsta Holdings can be described as tightly focused, if not narrow; he does not appear to have
considered certain controversial issues which have received signi cant academic attention, such as the interrelationship
between equitable compensation and equitable accounting principles.  It is hoped that the eventual decision by the
Court of Appeal will provide clarity on these matters.
The remainder of this comment will instead examine two other questions which arise directly from the Judge’s decision:
First, was the Judge right in (in reasoning as well as outcome) in concluding that but-for causation should apply, without any
reversal of the burden of proof? Second, is the Brickenden rule truly incompatible with that conclusion?
But-For Causation to Be Proved By the Principal – Already
the Requirement Under Singapore Law
“(a) QAM clari ed the burden-shifting function of the Brickenden decision, i.e. once the principal adduces some
evidence to connect the breach to the loss, the evidential burden shifts to the  duciary to prove that but-for his
breach, the loss would still have occurred; and
(b) bearing in mind this burden-shifting function of the Brickenden rule, Then Khek Koon should not be understood
as dispensing with the need for but-for causation altogether.”
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The Judge’s decision was reached on the basis that he agreed with the reasoning in AIB. Without faulting that conclusion, it
bears mentioning that this also follows, as a matter of binding authority, from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ohm Paci c
Sdn Bhd v Ng Hwee Cheng Doreen  (Ohm).
Like Brickenden, Ohm concerned a  duciary (also a solicitor) who failed to disclose to the principal (the client) his or her
interest in a third party’s business, and who then acted for the principal in a transaction with that third party which allegedly
caused loss to the principal. In Ohm, the contract was for the third party (Paci c Navigation) to provide bridging  nance for
the purchase of a vessel and subsequently to operate the vessel as managing agent for the principal (Ohm). The defendant
solicitor was a shareholder and director of Paci c Navigation. The vessel was later arrested in an in rem action following
Ohm’s failure to pay operating and other fees owing to Paci c Navigation.  Ohm sued the solicitor for, inter alia, her
breach of the no-con ict rule, seeking equitable compensation (albeit framed, incorrectly, as “damages”) for its lost
earnings and the costs it incurred defending the action.
Although Brickenden itself was not cited in Ohm, a similar rule was proposed on the basis of other authorities and was
expressly rejected by the Court of Appeal, which stated that:
The Court of Appeal a rmed the  nding of the trial judge that causation had not been proven.
Ohm thus stands for the proposition that but-for causation applies to equitable compensation for breach of  duciary duty,
without any reversal of the burden of proof. Ohm was acknowledged in QAM and Then Khek Koon, but the High Court in
those cases reasoned that Ohm set out a general rule which was modi ed in the Brickenden “class” of cases.  With
respect, that is not a sustainable distinction, as the facts of Ohm (a self-interested breach of the no-con ict rule by a
solicitor) fell squarely within the supposed carve-out for culpable breaches of core  duciary duties by a  duciary falling
within an established class of  duciary. Ohm is thus in the same “class” of cases as Brickenden, and is inconsistent with the
proposition that such facts trigger a more principal-friendly set of causation rules. Subsequent Singapore cases applying
Brickenden appear to have mistakenly taken the distinction drawn in QAM and Then Khek Koon at face value, overlooking
the inconsistency with Ohm.
Consequently, the question in Winsta Holding was not an open one under Singapore law – Ohm had already reached the
same conclusion. By the same token, when Winsta Holding reaches the Court of Appeal, the Court will not be starting from
a blank slate (despite the assumption to that e ect in Maryani Sadeli), but will instead be confronted with the question of
whether to depart from its previous decision in Ohm.
What Brickenden Really Established
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“it is necessary for the appellants to prove a causal connection between the breach of duty and the alleged loss.
No principle could be extracted from the cases that once a breach of duty was shown the burden fell on the
respondent as a
defaulting  duciary to show that the loss did not result from her breach…”
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If one accepts that the Judge was right to hold that but-for causation is needed and must be proved by the principal, must
one also conclude that the Judge was right to reject the Brickenden rule? In the author’s view, the answer is negative.
To properly understand the Brickenden rule, one should begin with the dictum by Lord Thankerton from which the rule
arose:
As Matthew Conaglen has observed, the meaning of Lord Thankerton’s dictum is “di cult to decipher” because, among
other things, it appears to prevent the calling of evidence which would help to avoid the “speculation” which the dictum
states is to be avoided, and also seems to draw upon principles which, on an orthodox view, should be con ned to  duciary
relationships involving stewardship of assets.
A further di culty arises from the reference to the  duciary “commit[ting] a breach of  duciary duty by non-disclosure of
material facts” (emphasis added). This could be read as meaning that non-disclosure is the breach. This is signi cant, as
the court’s choice of event from which causation is drawn has as great an in uence on the outcome as the court’s choice of
the rules of causation to apply to that event.
It is respectfully suggested that Lord Thankerton chose his words with less than perfect precision. It should be recalled that
under the orthodox understanding of  duciary law,  duciary duties are proscriptive, not prescriptive; as Lord Woolf put it in
Attorney-General v Blake, equity “tells the  duciary what he must not do. It does not tell him what he ought to do.”  Lord
Woolf’s dictum continues to  nd judicial support, particularly in Australia, which has consistently applied the orthodox
(strictly proscriptive) view  Despite some academic criticism,  and the controversial decision of the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales in Item Software UK Ltd v Fassihi  (which went so far as to recognise a positive  duciary duty to
disclose one’s prior misconduct), the academic consensus favours the orthodox view.
In Singapore, the Court of Appeal has recently con rmed that the orthodox view still applies in its decisions in Tan Yok
Koon v Tan Choo Suan and another and other appeals  and Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd and other appeals and
other matters.  It follows that a breach of  duciary duty arises when the  duciary commits a proscribed act (eg, when she
acts under a con ict or obtains a secret pro t). Disclosing in advance the con ict or pro t, and obtaining the principal’s
informed consent to it, is not a positive obligation, but rather a means of avoiding liability that would otherwise arise when
the  duciary proceeds to act.
This can be more easily appreciated if one considers the position at the time the  duciary has formed the intention to act,
but not yet acted. At that point, the  duciary has not crossed the Rubicon; she still has the option of refraining from acting at
all. Is she, nonetheless, already under a positive duty of disclosure? If so, the implication is that a  duciary who intends to
act under a con ict or make a secret pro t, and fails to make disclosure, has already breached her  duciary duty even if
“When a party, holding a  duciary relationship, commits a breach of  duciary duty by non-disclosure of material
facts, which his constituent is entitled to know in connection with the transaction, he cannot be heard to maintain
that disclosure would not have altered the decision to proceed with the transaction, because the constituent’s
action would be solely determined by some other factor, such as the valuation by another party of the property
proposed to be mortgaged. Once the Court has determined that the nondisclosed facts were material, speculation
as to what course the constituent, on disclosure, would have taken, is not relevant.”
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she eventually decides not to act at all. This would come close to punishing intention without more and would be a harsh
conclusion even for  duciary law. The fairer and more logical view is that there is no duty to disclose, but a  duciary omits
to do so at her own peril (as she thereby forgoes the opportunity to pre-empt liability).
With this in mind, a simpler reading of Brickenden presents itself. Rather than departing from but-for causation or o ering
an evidentiary aid in proving it, Brickenden merely identi es the relevant act from which but-for causation is to be drawn.
This argument has been forcefully made by Matthew Conaglen, who characterises the Brickenden rule as “identifying the
relevant counterfactual against which the plainti ’s loss properly falls to be assessed”, which should be “the
counterfactual of what would have happened if the  duciary had not acted with the relevant con ict or taken the
unauthorised pro t.”  He argues that the court should choose this, rather than the counterfactual of disclosure having
been made, because it is more consistent with the prophylactic aims of  duciary law.
The author agrees with Conaglen’s analysis, but respectfully suggests that his premises in fact support a more robust
conclusion. Conaglen appears to assume that there is no default answer to the question, thus necessitating the application
of the Brickenden rule to  ll the gap. The more accurate picture is that Conaglen’s preferred counterfactual is already the
default, and that the court would need compelling reasons to depart from that default position.
This can be seen if one considers the common law position. Before committing a breach, a contract-breaker could try to
avoid liability through various ways, such as a variation or waiver of the relevant contractual term. Similarly, a tortfeasor
could seek the victim’s consent to the intended tortious act. Despite this, the court determining but-for causation in contract
or tort is only concerned with what would have happened if the contract-breaker had performed her obligation or if the
tortfeasor had not performed the tortious act – not what would have happened had the contract-breaker/tortfeasor sought
consent in advance. Simply put, the law recognises consent, but does not generally deal in hypothetical consent. Even the
exceptional example of Wrotham Park damages, which are based on a hypothetical bargain between the wrongdoer and
the innocent party to waive the right which was infringed or grant a licence for the act, only operates in favour of the
innocent party to  ll the remedial lacuna where that party would otherwise be left with no or only nominal damages, not in
favour of a wrongdoer who would otherwise be liable for a larger sum.
The question that remains is whether there is any reason for equity to provide an escape route to a breaching  duciary
which is not available to a contract-breaker or tortfeasor. It is di cult to conceive of such an argument. If anything,  duciary
law should be stricter with a breaching  duciary, as it aims to deter breach and has a policy of favouring the interests of the
principal over the  duciary’s freedom of action.  Hence, the only reasonable position to adopt is that the relevant causal
inquiry is whether the loss would have been incurred had the  duciary not acted, rather than whether the principal would
have consented had full disclosure been made.
Conclusion
Returning to the facts of Winsta Holding, it is apparent that the interpretation of Brickenden proposed above is perfectly
consistent with the Judge’s reasoning. In fact, the Judge e ectively did apply that interpretation of Brickenden. He did not
ask whether the Winsta Group would have given their informed consent had the defendant directors made disclosure
(which is the inquiry which Brickenden states is irrelevant). He instead asked whether the Winsta Group would have
obtained the bene t of the opportunities had the opportunities not been diverted by the defendant directors, whether the
entry into the IPTs caused loss to the Winsta Group, and whether the combined e ect of the breaches had led to the
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Winsta Subsidiaries having to be wound up.  In other words, the Judge traced causation from the acts constituting
breaches of the no-con ict and no-pro t rules, not from the omissions to disclose.
Hence, the actual outcome as well as the underlying reasoning in Winsta Holding would have been given better e ect not
by rejecting the Brickenden rule, but by recognising that the Brickenden “rule” is a statement of the natural outcome when
one applies but-for causation to a breach of a proscriptive duty. The reason the court will not speculate as to what the
principal would have done had disclosure been made is simply that that is the wrong causal question to begin with, not that
a special rule is needed to bar such inquiries.
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